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In this paper we discuss whether or not ‘governance’ is an important source of
variation in development experiences. We draw four main conclusions. First, gov-
ernance is best thought of a sub-set of ‘institutions’ and as such emphasis on gov-
ernance is consistent with much recent academic work. Nevertheless, governance
is a quite vague rubric which it is di￿cult to unbundle. Second, the governance of
a society is the outcome of a political process and as such is closely related to the
literature on the political economy of development. Third, improving governance
necessitates understanding the nature of the entire political equilibrium. Finally,
an important research frontier is understanding the forces that create or impeded
endogenous changes in governance.
21. Introduction
Like it or not there are fashions in social science and in beliefs about which par-
adigm is the correct one for understanding the world. Such fashions are highly
prevalent in the study of economic development. When Max Plank famously re-
marked that \science advances one funeral at a time" he seriously underestimated
the creativity of the scholars, policymakers and practitioners in this ￿eld and their
willingness to accept new ideas. A current paradigm puts issues of \governance"
at the heart of an understanding of development. Poor countries are poor because
they have bad governance and countries that grow or are rich are those that im-
proved their governance. Such a view of development is now enshrined as a key
mission of the World Bank whose former President Paul Wolfowitz (2006) summed
up this conventional wisdom in the following way during a speech in Indonesia
\In the last half-century we have developed a better understanding
of what helps governments function e￿ectively and achieve economic
progress. In the development community, we have a phrase for it. We
call it good governance. It is essentially the combination of transpar-
ent and accountable institutions, strong skills and competence, and a
fundamental willingness to do the right thing. Those are the things
that enable a government to deliver services to its people e￿ciently ...
An independent judiciary, a free press, and a vibrant civil society and
important components of good governance. They balance the power
of governments, and they hold them accountable for delivering better
services, creating jobs, and improving living standards."
In practice bad governance is often associated with corruption and re￿ecting
this President Wolfowitz continued
\Today one of the biggest threats to development in many countries,
including I think here, is corruption. It weakens fundamental systems,
it distorts markets, and it encourages people to apply their skills and
energies in nonproductive ways. In the end, governments and citizens
3will pay a price, a price in lower incomes, in lower investment, and in
more volatile economic ￿uctuations."
One can easily ￿nd a plethora of examples from the development experience
of the past 50 years which loosely support the notion that bad governance is the
root of underdevelopment. The locus classicus of how poor governance derailed
development in Africa is Tony Killick’s Development Economics in Action. Killick
reports in detail the sad litany of governance failures in Ghana in the 1960s. A
startling example is the construction of a fruit canning factory \for the production
of mango products, for which there was recognized to be no local market, [and]
which was said to exceed by some multiple the total world trade in such items"
(Killick, 1978, p.229). The governments own report on this factory is worth quot-
ing at some length (Killick, 1978, p. 233)
\Project A factory is to be erected at Wenchi, Brong Ahafo, to produce
7,000 tons of mangoes and 5,300 tons of tomatoes per annum. If
average yields of crops in that area will be 5 tons per acre per annum
for mangoes and 5 tons per acre for tomatoes, there should be 1,400
acres of mangoes and 1,060 acres of tomatoes in the ￿eld to supply
the factory.
The Problem The present supply of mangoes in the area is from a few
trees scattered in the bush and tomatoes are not grown on commercial
scale, and so the production of these crops will have to start from
scratch. Mangoes take 5-7 years from planting to start fruiting. How
to obtain su￿cient planting materials and to organize production of
raw materials quickly become the major problems of this project."
Killick’s acerbic comment is that \it is di￿cult to imagine a more damning
commentary on the e￿ciency of project planning" stated a whole year before
the factory was constructed. This is certainly an example of dreadful governance
leading to a huge misallocation of resources and helping to perpetuate the poverty
of Ghana. Nevertheless, there is a big jump from examples of bad governance like
4this to an explanation for comparative development and useful policy advice. For
one thing, one needs to explain why on earth this happened. For another, one
needs to carefully establish the causal e￿ect of bad governance in circumstances
where governance is endogenous and there are many omitted variables.
In this chapter we aim to assess the state of knowledge about the role of gov-
ernance in development. Of course not all scholars agree with the view that poor
development is caused by poor governance and there are many approaches to com-
parative development. Some scholars dismiss governance out of hand, for instance
Sachs et al. (2004) assert that poor countries cannot a￿ord good governance and
after regressing various measures of governance on GDP per-capita use the resid-
uals to assert that many African countries have surprisingly good governance!
Others, such as Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2008) recognize that governance
may be an issue, but list it as only one among many other factors which may be
the ‘binding constraint’ on growth in any particular society.
Still others would criticize the emphasis of Paul Wolfowitz on ‘public gover-
nance’ and the role of the state. Most of the governance literature considers how
society is governed in isolation from how it is organized. To apply an old-fashioned
distinction, most attention is devoted to the superstructure of society, very little
to the base of the economy. Governance, however, is not only about those who
govern, but also about those who are governed. The basic habits of those who are
governed are essential in determining public governance. All this was clearly seen
by Alexis de Toqueville. After his nine months visit to America in 1830 he wrote:
\Among the new objects that attracted my attention during my
stay in the United States none struck my eye more vividly than the
equality of conditions. I discovered without di￿culty the enormous
in￿uence that this primary fact exerts on the course of society; it gives
a certain direction to public spirit, a certain turn to the laws, new
maxims to those who govern, and particular habits to the governed."
(2000, p 3)
Though most of the work on governance and development ignores these issues
there are many who would argue that forms of ‘private governance’ are crucial for
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Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) on corporate governance and its re-
lation to legal systems. While the importance of the legal system for explaining
development (and even corporate governance) is moot (Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson, 2001, Acemoglu, and Johnson, 2005, Lamoreux and Rosenthal, 2005)
there is no doubt that many aspects of private governance di￿er across countries
(see Bloom and van Reenan, 2007, for important evidence) and that this may be
an important source of variation in development experiences. Though one may
ultimately be able to treat many aspects of private governance as related to the
state,1 this may not be true of other aspects of the form of organizations and
private governance, such as what Kreps called ‘corporate culture’ (Kreps, 1986).
This notion relates more basically to the nature of social equilibria which generate
trust or cooperation and which may di￿er radically across societies (as empha-
sized by Platteau, 2000, Dixit, 2004, Fafchamps, 2004 or Greif, 2006). Though
we regard the issue of ‘private governance’ as important and we introduce some
elements of it into our discussion, for example in our discussion of social capital,
de facto political power, and the Scandinavian experience, the many potential
dimensions of this issue mean that it is beyond the scope of our essay. Following
de Toqueville we therefore introduce aspects of private governance to the extent
that they in￿uence the nature of public governance.
We draw the following conclusions. First, the literature on governance is most
usefully thought of as part of the larger literature on the relationship between
institutions and economic development. Following in the footsteps of North and
Thomas (1973) a recent empirical literature, particularly the papers of Hall and
Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005b), has tried
to estimate the causal e￿ect of economic institutions on development. They ￿nd
that the preponderance of income di￿erences between poor and rich countries
can be explained by di￿erences in these institutions.2 Though this empirical
1See Roe (2003) and Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) on the importance of state politics in
explaining corporate governance.
2Though it is somewhat controversial we include economic policies along with economic
institutions. Policies, like institutions, are chosen by those with political power and they have
6literature emphasizes security of property rights, not governance, as being the
most crucial institution, it also recognizes that what matters for development
is a ‘cluster of institutions’. The right way to think about governance is as a
potentially important part of this cluster of institutions. So far governance has
not been ‘unbundled’ (to use the terminology of Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005),
so we do not have de￿nitive evidence for the importance of governance, but there
is evidence that some parts of what people mean by this is surely important for
development. We note, however, that since governance is really a vague rhetoric
it may be intrinsically impossible to unbundle it.
Second, to understand governance and why it varies one has to study the po-
litical economy of development. Poor governance is not exogenously assigned and
is the outcome of political decisions and as a result will re￿ect the political insti-
tutions and sources of power in society which mould the political process. Never-
theless, there is still a great deal of uncertainty about what political institutions
or circumstances lead to good policies and institutions. Some variables, such as
measures of constraints on the executive and measures of checks and balances are
robustly correlated with development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005a,
Henisz, 2000). But such measures are often equilibrium outcomes, rather than re-
lated to more speci￿c institutions such as the form of the constitution. Focusing on
these we know that there is little evidence that the form of the constitution, such
as whether the system is presidential or parliamentary, matters for growth, and
other aspects of the form of government, such as whether or not it is democratic,
do not seem to correlated with development either. As yet, we do not have a satis-
factory characterization of the circumstances which lead to a political equilibrium
which is conducive to economic growth in a society and it appears that there are
many ways in which property rights security, for example, can be achieved. We
emphasize these issues by examining the political economy of the ‘Scandinavian
model’ of governance and development. If the nature of the political forces that
generate stable property rights in early 21st century China are very di￿erent from
those that do so in the United States, so the economic institutions and patterns
large impacts on the incentive structure of society so for the purposes of the discussion it is not
important to distinguish between them.
7of governance which generated such rapid growth in Scandinavia during the 20th
century are likewise very dissimilar from those of the United States.
Third, from a policy point of view, the key issue is to understand the entire
political equilibrium. Governance reform is unlikely to be successful unless we
understand the political forces that generate bad governance in the ￿rst place.
In lieu of such an understanding, policy reforms to improve governance will often
be ine￿ective. We suggest that to be e￿ective reform has to change the political
equilibrium of a society. Though it is possible that small changes may do this, it
is more likely that reform has to take place simultaneously in many dimensions.
Finally, a research priority is to try to understand salient cases of endogenous
transitions from bad to good governance (or vice versa, though this is much less
common) to identify some generalizations about the factors or circumstances that
lead to improved institutions, and by implication, better governance.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section we ask what is governance?
Section 3 then asks how governance can be measured. Section 4 discusses what
theoretical mechanisms might link governance with development and illustrates
the political economy of bad governance with an extended case study of Sierra
Leone. In section 5 we then discuss the correlates of governance and evidence
which suggests that governance has a causal e￿ect on economic development. We
include here a discussion of the ‘￿rst stage’ or what causes variation in gover-
nance. In section 6 we move to discussing how to improve governance. We here
emphasize that the political economy approach to governance suggests that there
will be many pitfalls in attempts to reform governance. Section 7 then exam-
ines some successful instances of institutional and governance reform and draws
some lessons. In this section we particularly focus on a great success story of the
endogenous emergence of good governance - the Scandinavian model. Section 8
concludes.
2. What is Governance?
The ￿rst thing is to decide what governance is. The Oxford English dictionary
de￿nes governance as \government, control, or authority" or alternatively as \the
8action, manner, or system of governing". The organizers of the World Bank’s
governance project and website de￿ne governance to be,
\the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is
exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are
selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to
e￿ectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect
of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic
and social interactions amongst them." Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobat￿ on (1999, p. 1)
These de￿nitions of governance, as with that proposed by Wolfowitz, are obvi-
ously very broad and include not just an emphasis on state capacity and the abil-
ity of the government to implement autonomous decisions, which many associate
with governance, but also on the form of political institutions which determine
who governs and presumably what choices they make. For example, both de￿n-
itions also stress that accountability is a part of governance. Wolfowitz stresses
this directly, while Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobat￿ on do so indirectly through
their ￿rst criterion.
These de￿nitions of governance are so broad that they encompass nearly all
aspects of the political institutions of a society in addition to the structure and
capacity of the state. Indeed, the only thing they don’t directly refer to are the
objectives of the government, though ex-President Wolfowitz mentions a \funda-
mental willingness to do the right thing".
In this chapter by the governance of a society we shall mean two things. First,
the nexus of political institutions in society construed broadly. We therefore mean
not only things such as the form of the constitution and electoral system, whether
or not there is democracy, whether the state is federal, and the system of political
parties. But also other factors which in￿uence the political power of di￿erent
groups and individuals in society, such as whether or not they can solve the col-
lective action problem, exert in￿uence, exploit connections, and maybe even ￿re
guns. Such institutions determine the aggregation of preferences in society and
thus what institutions and policies arise in equilibrium. Second, governance also
9refers to the implementation of such collective choices once made. This includes
such issues as state capacity and the ability of the state to coherently and e￿-
ciently implement policies and the extent and impact of corruption.
It should be clear that with respect to the ￿rst meaning, the organization of the
economy and perhaps the nature of society more broadly, ‘private governance,’ will




We cannot aspire here to overview the available sources of information on political
institutions. Most of these, such as those compiled by Freedom House, the Polity
Project, or the book by Persson and Tabellini (2003), are well known and we
discuss these when they come up in our analysis. There are other sources of
political power of course, such as the ability of groups to solve the collective
action problem, and whether or not the central state has a monopoly of violence.
These have been much less systematically measured, but they may be just as
important in poor countries for the nature of the political equilibrium.
3.2. State Capacity and E￿ectiveness
There are several sources for cross-country comparisons of this aspect of gover-
nance. The main one, or at least the main one which uses this terminology, is
the World Bank’s Governance project. For the past decade or so they have been
collecting information on many institutional variables which are closely related
to di￿erent notions of governance. These are, (1) Voice and Accountability, (2)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence, (3) Government E￿ectiveness, (4)
Regulatory Quality, (5) Rule of Law, and (6) Control of Corruption. Table 1
reports data from the last four of these variables for a variety of countries which
pertain to the second sense in which governance is de￿ned in the previous section.
We use the latest data we have from the World Bank, which is 2005, and in the
10￿rst four columns show the bottom decile of the distribution of countries. All
the series are normalized to lie between 2.5 and -2.5, with -2.5 being the lowest
possible score.
Table 1 shows that there is a fair amount of agreement amongst these di￿er-
ent dimensions of governance about which countries in the world have the worst
governance. The usual suspects include Somalia, Haiti, Sudan, North Korea, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Myanmar (Burma). Needless to say, these
same countries would also be right at the bottom of any ranking of countries based
on voice and accountability or political stability and absence of violence.
The World Bank de￿nes government e￿ectiveness as \the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies." Regulatory quality
is de￿ned as \the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development."
Rule of law is de￿ned as \the extent to which agents have con￿dence in and
abide by the rules of society, and in particular of contract enforcement, the policy,
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence." Finally, control
of corruption is \the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as \capture" of the
state by elites and private interests" (World Bank, 2006, pp. 2-3).
These indices are constructed by unobserved components from 31 di￿erent
datasets collected by 25 di￿erent entities (see World Bank, 2006, p. 17). Some
of these datasets are surveys, while some of them represent the perceptions of
experts in di￿erent areas. Data based on expert perceptions has been much used
in the recent literature, for example the in￿uential data on the security of property
rights constructed by Political Risk Services. Obviously data based on perceptions
are problematic, in the absence of a valid instrument, in that one tends to see low
corruption in a country that is doing well and vice versa. For instance, Kang
(2002) speci￿cally argues that the notion that corruption fell in South Korea in
the 1960s is false and he claims that the growth of the economy simply led people
to believe that corruption must have been lower. Information can be based on
11the perceptions of only a small number of informants. It may also be true that
a free press, by denouncing more regularly corrupt practices, may give the image
of more corruption, while the actual amount is or becomes smaller. In addition,
to the extent that this data represents data about a country that is relevant to
international businessmen (the usual market for the ￿rms collecting this data)
there may also be an issue of whether governance for international investors is the
same as for domestic investors.
Nevertheless, one should be not overly skeptical about this data. Every source
of data has problems and many di￿erent and independent strategies for measuring
governance come up with similar rankings of countries and it seems unlikely that a
country in which foreign investors had to deal with corruption would be one where
its own citizens did not have to also deal with corruption, or that countries use one
bureaucracy for foreigners and another one for their domestic residents. Though
it may be true that President Mobutu’s Zairianization program was focused on
expropriating the assets of foreign nationals (Turner and Young, 1985, Chapter
11), the assets of Zairians were not safe either.
An example of one of the surveys used in constructing the World Bank’s gov-
ernance indicators in the BEEPS II Interactive Dataset: Enterprise Survey in
Transition, 2002.3 This is based on surveys of ￿rms in transition economies and
asks a series of questions about governance and corruption. For instance it asks
\When ￿rms in your industry do business with the government, how much of the
contract value would be typically paid in additional or uno￿cial payments/gifts
to secure the contract?" Other important surveys which the World Bank uses
for its governance indices include the Latin Barometer4 which, for example, asks
respondents to report actual percentages of corrupt o￿cials or actual number of
times they witnessed acts of corruption, and the Afrobarometer which also has
questions about governance and corruption.
Another important source of information on corruption comes from Trans-
parency International. Their corruption perceptions index is widely used in em-
pirical work (for instance Treisman, 2000, and Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi,
3http://info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps2002/
4http://www.latinobarometro.org
122003) and the ￿nal column of Table 1 shows the most corrupt countries in the
world according to Transparency International. Transparency International also
have a bribes index where they survey ￿rms and ask them about bribing.5
There are however other sources of information about governance and corrup-
tion. One of the most important and in￿uential studies of governance is that of
Putnam (1993). He focused on the factors that determined the comparative per-
formance of government in Italian regions. To do this he collected original data
on twelve measures of governance and tried to explain why these varied so much
within Italy. Several of the series he collected are very interesting and are worth
understanding in detail. One measure, which he called ‘budget promptness’ was
the average delay in approving the state budget over the period 1979-1985. The
date at which this happened was on average January 27 in Friuli-Venezia Giulia to
August 7 in Calabria. Another measure very relevant for state capacity is whether
or not the state had created any statistical or information facilities. Six regions,
Abruzzi, Calabria, Campania, Marche, Molise, Puglia and Sicily had none. Other
regions, such as Emilia-Romagna and Lombardia were well equipped with such
services. Putnam (1993) also collected information on legislative innovation. To
do this he examined twelve di￿erent areas on which similar laws appeared in dif-
ferent regions, for example air and water pollution, consumer protection, strip
mining regulation, etc. He then coded which regions led in implementing these
laws measuring on average across the twelve domains how soon after the ￿rst
appearance was the law implemented in a particular region. The pioneering re-
gion was given a score of 100 with a region that never adopted being given a 0.
This data was aggregated into an index of legislative innovation. A ￿nal index
of interest was that which attempted to measure bureaucratic responsiveness. To
construct this, in January 1983, researchers contacted regional bureaucracies re-
questing information on various issues, for instance the agricultural department
was asked, on behalf of a \farmer friend" for information about loans and subsi-
dies for experimental crops. The initial requests were by mail, and replies were
5Another source of data on corruption and governance comes from Business International
now incorporated into the Economist Intelligence Unit which was ￿rst used by Mauro (1995)
and also Treisman (2000).
13evaluated for their promptness, clarity and comprehensiveness. If no reply came
then follow up telephone calls were tried and even personal visits. From all this
information Putnam constructed an index of bureaucratic responsiveness. Fasci-
natingly, while in Emilia-Romagna and Valle d’Aosta two of the three requests
received detailed replies within one week in Calabria, Campania and Sardinia none
of the mailed requests received a reply at all.
With respect to data on corruption, an important study by Ferraz and Finan
(2008) used data on a random corruption audit of municipal governments carried
out by the central government in Brazil. They construct an index of corruption
which is simply the number of violations that mayors are found to have done.
Another innovative study is by Olken (2007) who used audit data on 600 road
projects in Indonesia to investigate the misallocation of funds.
4. Theoretical Mechanisms
Given the di￿erent ways that one can think of good governance, there are obviously
a huge number of di￿erent potential theoretical mechanisms linking governance
to development. Indeed, given that we shall emphasize the political roots of gov-
ernance, this topic encompasses almost the entire literature on political economy
and we cannot hope to survey this literature here. In this section therefore we
do the following, we ￿rst emphasize a few key ideas and present what we feel is a
basic approach to thinking about governance and the politics of governance. We
then illustrate the political forces that lead to bad governance with an in depth
case study of Sierra Leone since the political economy of decline here is very repre-
sentative of the political economy of governance in much of Sub-Saharan Africa.6
Development is caused by a society adopting institutions and policies that
create incentives for its citizens to save, invest and innovate. Though institu-
tions such as secure property rights create huge potential Pareto improvements in
society, in general, growth enhancing institutions have important distributional
e￿ects. To refer to an obvious example, though the insecurity of human and prop-
6This discussion presumes that the distribution of political power matters for the e￿ciency
of institutions and policies (see Acemoglu, 2003, 2006).
14erty rights in Darfur is a disaster for economic incentives, it is in the interests
of the current Sudanese government in Khartoum. These interests may not be
immediately economic, but can also be political. In the Sudanese case the policy
of the government towards Darfur is focused on maintaining power. Going back
to Table 1, this approach implies that while the rule of law, for example, may be
poor in Sudan, and even though this is costly for growth, the governing elite in
Khartoum is better o￿ without the rule of law (at least if that is the only way
they can retain their rents).7
Economic institutions and policies are endogenous and are determined as col-
lective choices of the society. Governance refers both to these choices, such as
whether to build an e￿ective bureaucracy or establish the rule of law, and also
refers to parts of the institutional nexus which lead to these choices by in￿uenc-
ing who has power and how it can be exercised. Clearly, there is no guarantee
that all individuals and groups will prefer the same set of economic institutions
because, as noted above, di￿erent economic institutions and policies lead to dif-
ferent distributions of incomes and power. Consequently, there will be a con￿ict
of interest over the choice of economic institutions. In such a situation it will
be the inherited distribution of political power in society that determines what
institution are chosen. The group with more political power will tend to secure
the set of economic institutions and policies that it prefers.
The distribution of political power in society is also endogenous, however.
Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) we distinguish between two components
of political power: de jure and de facto political power. Here de jure political
power refers to all types of power that originates from the political institutions
in society. Political institutions determine the constraints on and the incentives
of key actors in the political sphere. Examples of political institutions include
the form of government, for example, democracy vs. dictatorship or autocracy,
and the extent of constraints on politicians and political elites. However, a group
of individuals, even if they are not allocated power by political institutions, for
example as speci￿ed in the constitution, may nonetheless possess political power.
7On the nature and behavior of the elite in the Sudan see Seekers of Truth and Justice (2000)
and Cobham (2005).
15Namely, they can engage in collective action, revolt, use arms, hire mercenaries,
or use economically costly but largely peaceful protests in order to impose their
wishes on society. We refer to this type of political power as de facto political
power.
It will be this composition of de facto and de jure power in society that deter-
mines the actual power of a group or set of interests and this will determine which
economic institutions and policies arise. This vision emphasizes that those with
power today take decisions not just to maximize their income today, but also to
maintain their grip on power. These goals are often in contradiction. This can be
for the simple reason that economic policies which increase even the incomes of
elites today may increase the incomes of opponents even more, thus in￿uencing
the future distribution of de facto power. It may also be that, as pointed out in
the seminal study by Bates (1981), good economic policies are often not good pol-
itics. In particular though providing public goods may increase the incomes of the
elite, staying in power may be better achieved by using redistributive instruments
which can be targeted at supporters and withheld from opponents.
How does governance ￿t into this scheme of things? Used in the ￿rst sense, of
the nexus of political institutions, governance plays an important role in determin-
ing the distribution of de jure power in society. This matters for the aggregation
of preferences. For example if we consider the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in
England, we would identify the change in political institutions which endowed
Parliament with more power (see North and Weingast, 1989) as an improvement
of governance. It had important implications for the types of policies and eco-
nomic institutions that arose because it changed the distribution of de jure power
in the direction of those who had an interest in socially more desirable policies.
The Glorious Revolution was a change in governance not just because it changed
political institutions, but also because it led to a revolution in the nature of the
state and how it functioned. For instance, Brewer (1988) studied the creation
of the excise tax bureaucracy in 18th century England. Brewer (1988, Chapter
4) shows how a ￿scal-military state emerged after 1688 which needed a strength-
ened revenue base. Despite the fact that many positions in the bureaucracy were
venal and there was a lot of corruption, both Whig and Tory governments built
16a highly e￿cient and meritocratic excise bureaucracy because they needed new
taxes to fund naval expansion. Figure 1 shows the excise rounds of Supervisor
George Cowperthwaite between the 12th of June and the 5th of July 1710. Brewer
records that during this trip Supervisor Cowperthwaite travelled 290 miles, vis-
ited 263 victuallers, 71 maltsters, 20 chandlers and one common brewer. In all he
took 81 di￿erent measurements of production and checked the work of 9 di￿erent
excisemen who worked for him. The government stopped corruption by collecting
a huge amount of information, creating incentives and punishments and also regu-
larly rotated excise o￿cials in order to stop them colluding with local employers.8
So the Glorious Revolution led to changes in both senses of governance we dis-
cussed above.9
Our theoretical approach to governance is not the approach of many studies.
For instance, much of the work on corruption sees it as an inevitable by-product
of bureaucracy and the principal agent problems inherent in having a state (see
for example, Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna, Mullainathan, 2007). This literature
often focuses on the way corruption can be mitigated or eliminated, as well as
its’ consequences for private incentives and resource allocation.10 Our emphasis
instead is on the political equilibrium of which corruption may be one consequence.
Though corruption in bureaucracies may be the inevitable result of principal agent
problems, and no doubt takes place in every country of the world, we are dubious
that variation in this type of corruption is su￿cient to account for ￿rst-order
patterns of development. The type of corruption that one sees in countries such
as Sierra Leone, which we examine next, may be su￿cient, but as we shall argue
this corruption has to be seen as part of a vector of governance pathologies which
stemmed from the political strategy of the government of Sierra Leone.
8Interestingly, though it was possible to purchase commissions in the British army until the
1870s this was never possible in the (much more important) navy.
9There now a small but important theoretical literature on the political economy of state
capacity, see Acemoglu (2005b), Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2006) and Besley and Persson
(2007).
10Important studies in this enormous literature include Lui (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1992),
Besley and McLaren (1993), Mookherjee and Png (1995), Banerjee (1997), Acemoglu and Verdier
(1998, 2000) and Chand and Moene (1999), see Bardhan (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Aidt
(2003) and Svensson (2005) for useful overviews of the literature on corruption.
174.1. The Political Economy of Governance in Sierra Leone
In 2002 Sierra Leone emerged from a 9 year civil war as possibly the poorest
country in the World in terms of per-capita income and ranked last in terms
of the United Nation’s Human Development Index. The political and economy
history of the country since independence in 1961 can be easily summarized. After
the early governments of Sir Milton Margai and his brother Sir Albert Margai,
successive leaders of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), the country was
ruled from 1967 by the All People’s Congress Party (APC) until it was ejected
from power by a military coup in 1992. During this period, under the presidencies
of Siaka Stevens until 1985 and subsequently Joseph Momoh, the economy declined
almost monotonically and state institutions collapsed. The coup, led by a group of
young o￿cers who formed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), was
in response to the widening civil war which began with the ￿rst incursion across
the border from Liberia of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in March 1991.
It is clear that Sierra Leone is a poor country because it has had terrible
governance. Though the civil war which blighted the country between 1991 and
2002 caused further economic hardship and distress, the main reason that Sierra
Leone emerged from war as the world’s poorest country, is that it entered the war
with that status in 1991.11 Sierra Leone is not intrinsically poor, it has diamonds
and great agricultural potential and is close to European markets. Had governance
been better Sierra Leone may not have become South Korea or Taiwan, but at
worst it would have become Botswana.
The British colonial administration seems to have had little interest in develop-
ing the country and even appears to have actively undermined business interests of
Krios (the descendents of freed slaves who formed something of an elite during the
colonial period) from Freetown, for example by promoting Lebanese commercial
interests. The British also designed political institutions in the 1950s to guar-
antee that the more educated Krios would not dominate the politics of a newly
independent Sierra Leone. Since independence, a sequence of politicians has had
11There is total consensus in the academic literature on this see Davies (2007) for a recent
authoritative view, also Luke and Riley (1989) and Kallon (2004).
18no interest or incentive in providing the most elementary things which can lead a
society to prosper. The main reason for this is that post-independent politicians
ruled the country using the political strategy of patrimonialism, and the general
unaccountability of the political class led to a high degree of kleptocracy.12
Patrimonialism, also called ‘neo-patrimonialism’, ‘personal rule’ or more sim-
ply ‘clientelism’, is a style of governance where politicians control power through a
system of personal relationships where policies/favors are distributed in exchange
for political support. There are several reasons that this is disastrous for economic
policy and performance and they hinge mostly on how the exchange is structured
in order to maximize the control and bargaining power of those running such
regimes.
First, the form in which patrimonial or clientelistic exchanges have to take
place is highly ine￿cient. For instance, patrons will ￿nd it politically desirable
to use private goods which can be targeted to supporters and withheld from
opponents. Public goods are not politically attractive ways to generate support
and are thus generically under-supplied under patrimonialism.
Second, patrimonial rulers need to make people reliant on them for their future
success or failure. To do this they create insecurity and uncertainly which only
they can resolve. To quote a famous example, Rafael Trujillo, who ruled the
Dominican Republic for 31 years forced all politicians to write a resignation letter
which he kept in his desk. One parliamentarian was served with his resignation
during his own speech in parliament (Turits, 2003, for this story). One robust
consequence of patrimonialism is that property rights are insecure. People only
have property because patrons allow them to have it, but such rights are always
conditional and can be withdrawn. This creates terrible incentives to invest in
assets. Moreover, laws are selectively applied with no concept of the rule of law
or equality before the law which of course are completely inconsistent with how
clientelism is dispensed. In a patrimonial regime you have rights if you are a
client of the patron and otherwise you do not. The application of uniform rules
or criteria to allocate resources impedes the ability of patrons to use discretion.
12See Cartwright (1970) and Clapham (1976) for the politics of the early independence period.
19Third, as Bates (1981) ￿rst pointed out, patrimonial regimes create distortions
in market prices to create rents which can then be politically allocated. When
supply is not equal to demand, something is in short supply and this is a great
political resource to those who can allocate it. This creates massive economic
distortions, but is can be good politics.
Finally, patrimonialism undermines the coherence of the bureaucracy. This
is because the bureaucracy represents a potential source of political opposition
to patrons, and a consequence is that bureaucrats are continually \shu￿ed" so
that they cannot conspire against rulers - a rather di￿erent type of shu￿ing from
that experienced by 18th century British excise tax collectors. Another reason
seems to be that bureaucrats in patrimonial regimes are even encouraged to be
corrupt and steal, perhaps because this gives patrons move leverage over them.
As Mobutu S￿ es￿ e Seko famously said in this context
\If you want to steal, steal a little in a nice way. But if you steal
too much to become rich overnight, you’ll be caught" quoted in Gould
(1980 , p. 485)
This strategy of patrimonialism makes it very di￿cult for a central state to
really establish and institutionalize its’ capacity and control over its’ territory. At
some level, as we shall shortly discuss, patrimonialism is an attempt to create a
national political order, but it does so not by eliminating alternative sources of
authority in society, but by co-opting them. It does so not by trying to create a
national identity, but by attempting to disarticulate potential sources of opposi-
tion or alternative identities. This leaves many sources of potential challenges to
patrimonial rule simmering close to the surface and is why many of them break
down. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that civilian control of the military
seems to be inconsistent with patrimonialism, possibly because the regimes lack
legitimacy and also because by their nature highly personalized regimes are very
easy for even small groups of dissident soldiers to overthrow.13 The reaction to
13For example, the 100 year rule of the True Whig Party in Liberia was overthrown in 1980
by just 18 men led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe.
20this is that patrimonial regimes tend to keep the military very weak so as not
to mount a credible threat. Instead, they often privatize security with presidents
having bodyguards, often consisting of foreign nationals.
This somewhat stylized vision of how a patrimonial regime functions seems to
￿t quite well with accounts of how Stevens and Momoh ran the country. They
used the control and discretion that this gave them to loot the nation’s wealth.
This description also seems to help understand the utter lack of provision of public
services and the increasing inability of the central state to impose its’ writ on the
country. The characterization ￿ts right down to the decision by Stevens shortly
after assuming power to cut the army to 1,000 men since it was initially a coup
that had stopped him assuming power in 1967. Stevens also privatized violence
creating a private security force initially named the Internal Security Unit (the
ISU - which was apparently referred to by his long-su￿ering people as ‘I Shoot
U’) and afterwards the Special Security Division (SSD - or ‘Siaka Steven’s Dogs’,
Jackson, 2004, p. 63, Keen, 2005, p. 17 on these acronyms). In the end it was
a group of only 30 soldiers led by Captain Valentine Strasser which pitched the
APC regime from power on April 30, 1992.
The APC came to power on the basis of strong support in the North of the
country, particularly from the Temne and Limba ethnic groups. Patrimonialism
was perfected to a ￿ne art by Stevens, who was known as ‘Pa Siakie’ (father of
the nation - Kpundeh, 1995, p. 23). Though Stevens built his patrimonialism
on the social networks of the APC and much of the academic literature on this
topic emphasizes the importance of informal relations, the strategy was greatly
facilitated by changes in political institutions which began soon after he assumed
power. Importantly, these involved making himself president and concentrating
power in the executive, suspending democracy and creating a one-party state,
￿rst de facto in 1973 and then de jure in 1977. Stevens also seriously manipulated
traditional political institutions such as Chiefship, buying support through the
distribution of patronage and jobs, privatizing and personalizing state ￿nances
and looting the diamond wealth of the country (Barrows, 1976, Tangri, 1978,
21Reno, 1995).14 Violence and the coercion of political opponents, if not on the
scale of Omar Al Bashir, Idi Amin, Samuel Doe, Mengistu Haile Miriam or Charles
Taylor, was a regular feature of life and criticism was not tolerated. A notorious
example being the murder in 1980 by defenestration from a top ￿oor o￿ce window
of Sam Bangura, the governor of the central bank (Reno, 1995, pp. 137-141). This
was ‘politics of the belly’ writ large (Bayart, 1993). The regime also featured the
dominance of Freetown over the rest of the country and an urban bias (Lipton,
1979, Bates, 1981) which involved the reversal of decentralization and the abolition
of district councils in 1972.
Casual empiricism suggests that barely any public goods were provided in the
country in the 40 years prior to the end of the civil war and re-democratization
in 2002. After coming to power in 1967, Stevens, a man who apparently with-
out irony used to enjoy quoting the Krio aphorism \the cow eats where it is
tethered",15 famously pulled up the railway to Bo, Kenema and Pendembu and
sold o￿ all the track and rolling stock to make the change as irreversible as pos-
sible. Though interpretations of this event di￿er, a salient one is that he did
this to isolate Mendeland which was the area which most strongly supported the
SLPP (for instance Abraham and Sesay, 1993, p. 120, Richards, 1996, pp. 42-43,
Davies, 2007, pp. 684-685). The roads fell to pieces and schools disintegrated.
National television broadcasts stopped in 1987 when the transmitter was sold by
the Minister of Information and in 1989 a radio tower which relayed radio sig-
nals outside Freetown fell down ending transmissions outside the capital (Reno,
2003, p. 48 for these stories). Other aspects of economic policy also ￿t very well
with the classical analyses of patrimonial regimes. For example, the Sierra Leone
Produce Marketing Board, inherited from the British, had a monopsony over all
export crops, and paid farmers very low prices (Bates, 1981) as low as 40% of the
world level (Davies, 2007). The exchange rate was massively over-valued creat-
ing a black market and a scarce resource which Stevens’ allocated through what
Reno (1995) dubbed the ‘shadow economy’. According to Maddison’s data, GDP
14Stevens was not of course the ￿rst to interfere with chiefship. The British colonial state had
done this as did early SLPP governments (see Kilson, 1966).
15In Krio \who sai dem tie cow nar day e go eat" quoted in Stevens, 1984, p. 35.
22per-capita fell almost monotonically from the early 1970s onwards and declined to
about 40% of the level recorded at independence by the end of the civil war. As if
to add insult to injury, Stevens (1984) left a highly disingenuous autobiography!
There is a simple lesson from this section. Most of the things that people
refer to as ‘bad governance’ are the consequences of a particular strategy of rule
or power consolidation. They are not an inevitable outcome of principal agent
problems. No doubt there was bureaucratic corruption in Sierra Leone along the
lines studied in much of the literature on corruption, but this was second order
compared to the institutionalized bad governance emanating from the state itself.
5. Consequences and Causes of Variation in Governance
5.1. Correlates of Governance
There are several well established facts about the correlations between measures of
governance and corruption and various socioeconomic and institutional outcomes.
We produce some of these in a few ￿gures. Figures 2-5 shows the correlation
between the World Bank’s four main measures of governance we discussed above
and GDP per-capita. Figure 6 shows the relationship between average income and
the Transparency International corruption index. It is clear that these measures
of governance are all highly correlated with income, and also obviously highly
correlated with each other. Generally, one does not ￿nd a country with good rule
of law and endemic corruption. Though these indices of governance heavily use
subjective ratings by experts, the association between income and governance is
real. This is clear from Putnam’s data on Italy where his measures of governance
are highly correlated with regional income per-capita (see Putnam, 1993, Figure
4.2, p. 85) and from Figure 7 which shows the correlation from Ferraz and Finan
(2008) between the number of corrupt violations per-municipality in Brazil and
the income per-capita of the municipality. Clearly, more prosperous municipalities
have fewer corruption violations.
Obviously, however, these ￿gures say nothing about any type of causal rela-
tionship. One simple strategy to examine this might be to use panel data and
23country ￿xed e￿ects. To think about what this approach might yield Figures 8
and 9 plot the change in the World Bank’s measures of government e￿ectiveness
and control of corruption 1996-2003 against the change in the log of GDP per-
capita of the country over the same period. These changes are uncorrelated in
the case of control of corruption even though in quite a few cases the value of
the index changes quite a lot. On the other hand Figure 8 shows that there is
some evidence of a positive association between changes in income per-capita and
government e￿ectiveness over this period.16
Our perspective in this paper, however, is that one should think of governance
as something intimately related to the wider literature on institutions and growth.
From this perspective, one can interpret the evidence in Hall and Jones (1999)
and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) as demonstrating that gover-
nance has a causal e￿ect on economic growth. Nevertheless, one should perhaps
be cautious about this. First, these papers propose an instrument for economic
institutions and though the argument behind the instrument in Acemoglu, John-
son and Robinson involves elements of governance, they do not directly test a
hypothesis about governance. Other work, such as that of Mauro (1995) which
attempted to develop an instrument for corruption, is not very successful. Mauro
suggested that ethnolinguistic fragmentation in￿uences growth only via its impact
on corruption, which seems rather unlikely (see Acemoglu, 2005a for a discussion
of this issue). Other attempts to instrument measures of governance by vari-
ables such as settler mortality (e.g., Kaufman and Kraay, 2002) have exclusion
restrictions which are equally as implausible.
We would conclude therefore that while there is evidence that a ‘cluster of
institutions’ does have a causal e￿ect on economic development and it is plausible
that governance is connected to this, as yet governance has not been unbundled.
This is not very surprising since the word is used in many di￿erent ways and quite
imprecisely at that.
16The fact that the within variation does not suggest that the change in income per-capita
and control of corruption are correlated may suggest, along the lines of Acemoglu, Johnson,
Robinson and Yared (2008), that the correlation between the levels is due to the e￿ects of an
omitted variable.
245.2. The First-Stage
One of the most important aspects of the empirical approach of Hall and Jones
(1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) and the more historical
agenda developed by Engerman and Sokolo￿ (1997) was the focus on the sources of
variation of institutions.17 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson used variation in in-
stitutions within former European colonies arguing that historical mortality faced
by Europeans and density of indigenous population were important sources of
variation in the types of institutions that emerged. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson
and Yared (2008) shows that these same historical variables also predict long-run
democracy not just economic growth.
The general picture of institutional variation developed in these papers is that
the institutional organization of society has a strong tendency to persist. It is
implicit in the discussion so far that there are large forces which generate persis-
tence in the political economy equilibrium. If a certain group is empowered by the
existing structure of political power then they will choose economic institutions
that favor them. This will increase their wealth and be one channel through which
their de facto power will persist or increase. Moreover, those who hold power to-
day will not only be able to determine economic institutions today. They will also
be able to determine political institutions in the future which tends to cement the
de jure power of such a group. Hence the distribution of political power and thus
economic institutions is naturally highly persistent over time.
The tendency for institutions and patterns of governance to persist can also
be illustrated by returning to the observations of de Toqueville we quoted in the
introduction. Let us use \inequality" as a catch-all word for a wide range of eco-
nomic and social disparities. What Toqueville hinted at can then be visualized
as a political and economic system where (A) initial inequality a￿ects individual
and organizational behaviors| the selection of preferences of those who govern,
and the possibility to implement di￿erent policies towards those who are gov-
erned; (B) the selected behaviors and policies a￿ect the outcome and the social
and economic inequality which form the initial conditions (A’) for a new round of
17See also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999).
25political and economic behavior. The dynamics of the system loosely described by
(A){(B){(A’) can clearly be path dependent. While a high level of inequality can
generate policies and governance that induce or maintain inequality, a more egal-
itarian starting point can generate policies and governance that maintain this low
inequality. The system is in a long run equilibrium whenever initial inequalities
are reproduced.
Nevertheless, institutions and governance can change. There may be intrinsic
dynamics or shocks to the system that lead to redistributions of power and thus
changes in economic institutions. It may also be the case that the incentives
of those in power are changed, perhaps because of technical innovation or new
market opportunities, and this may change economic institutions we well.
This perspective suggests however that while small changes may cumulate into
systemic changes in institutions, the more usual case seems to be that at large
‘critical junctures’ the institutions of society are moulded and after that tend to
be highly inertial. This was why the current institutions of Latin America, for
example, look so di￿erent from those of North America. It was the apparent
importance of such critical junctures which led Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001) to focus on the institutional consequences of European colonialism.
An interesting way to see the importance of the emphasis on critical junctures is
to consider more broadly the consequences of factor endowments for development.
Engerman and Sokolo￿ (1997) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) show
how factor endowments at the time of colonization had large e￿ects of institutions.
But what about the impact of subsequent changes in factor endowments, such as
the role of oil in the 20th century? Some authors, such as Sachs and Warner
(1995) blame bad economic performance on the abundance of such resources.
Nevertheless, as Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) show, that what matters is
the combination of resource abundance and institutional quality. The growth
e￿ect of resource abundance varies with institutional quality. In countries with
good institutions, resource abundance attracts entrepreneurs into production. In
countries with weak institutions, however, entrepreneurs are diverted away from
production and into rent appropriation. The historically determined institutional
path that a society is on therefore subsequently conditions what happens when
26shocks, such as the discovery of oil, arise.18
There are many potential sources of institutional variation in the world and
to understand why Western Europe became so successful economically compared
to Eastern or Southern Europe one would need to appeal to very di￿erent histor-
ical events. Scholars who have focused on the emergence of capitalist institutions
in Western Europe, have focused on such systematic factors as the rise of the
mercantile economy (Pirenne, 1937), the di￿erential response of institutions to
the population collapse of the Black Death (Postan, 1944), di￿erent patterns of
social con￿ict (Brenner, 1976), the great shock of 1492 and the expansion of Euro-
pean powers into the world (Williams, 1944, Pomeranz, 2000, Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson, 2005), or the French Revolution (Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson and
Robinson, 2008). Institutions may also evolve in ways which depend on tech-
nology, as emphasized by White (1962), or even because of religious conversion
(Pirenne, 1939).
So understanding institutional variation necessitates an explicitly historical
approach. Two good examples of this come from the work by Putnam (1993)
and Evans and Rauch (1998, 1999). Putnam (1993) famously proposed that what
determined the measures of government performance discussed above was the
relative amount of social capital of di￿erent Italian regions. In Figures 10 and 11
use his data on the number of inhabitants per cultural or recreational association
in 1985. These associations include choral societies, hiking clubs and bird watching
groups. We plot this data against two of the variables we introduced above. Figure
10 shows the density of associational life to be negatively associated with the mean
budget delay while Figure 11 shows it to be positively associated with the quality
of interaction with the bureaucracy.
Why does social capital vary? Here Putnam argued that this had deep his-
torical roots related to the imposition of feudalism in the south of Italy in the
11th and 12th centuries after it was invaded by the Normans compared to the
development of self-governing communes in the north as the power of the Holy
Roman Empire declined (see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008, for an attempt
18See Haber and Menaldo (2007) who similarly ￿nd no e￿ect of oil on the political regime.
27to test this idea).
Another important example both of measurement and the historical evolution
of institutions comes from the research of Evans and Rauch (1998, 1999). They
conducted a survey of experts to collect information of the structure of the bu-
reaucracy in 35 countries. This project was an attempt to measure the extent to
which the bureaucracy was ‘weberian.’ Figures 12 plots the data they collected
on how meritocratic the bureaucracy was against the World Bank’s government
e￿ectiveness index. This shows that the greater the extent to which meritocratic
procedures are used, the more e￿ective is the government. The variable was
constructed by averaging the replies to the following two questions: (Evans and
Rauch, 1998, pp. 55-56) \Approximately what proportion of the higher o￿cials
in these agencies enter the civil service via a formal examination system?" and
\Of those that do not enter via examinations, what proportion have university or
post-graduate degrees?" Figure 13 instead plots against government e￿ectiveness
an index of how ‘weberian’ the state is from Evans and Rauch (1999) which uses
information from 10 di￿erent questions. Again the weberianess of the state is
positively correlated with the e￿ectiveness of the government.
Why is it that some countries have weberian states while others so not? Evans
(1995) suggests that this is the outcome of deep historical processes. For instance
he argued that the capable bureaucracy in South Korea was related to the histor-
ical organization of the bureaucracy and examination system.
Our emphasis here is not on the path dependence of particular institutions,
though we would not deny this can be important, but rather on the path depen-
dence and historical roots of the entire political equilibrium of which bureaucratic
capacity and governance more generally are two parts. In Sierra Leone, for ex-
ample, we emphasized that the poor performance of the bureaucracy was closely
tied to the ‘strategy of rule’ adopted after independence. More generally there
is a close relationship between clientelism and bureaucratic capacity. Indeed, the
connection between clientelism and poor governance emerges from Putnam’s data.
In Figure 14 we give one example. Here we plot the incidence of innovative laws,
discussed above, against the % of preference votes cast as a % of total possible
preference votes in the 1976 Italian national election. Voters in Italian elections
28at that time voted for a single national party list with seats being allocated in the
legislature by proportional representation. However, if people wished, they could
also indicate a preference for a particular candidate on that list. Such preference
voting is associated with clientelistic exchanges. Figure 14 shows that clientelism
thus measured is inversely related with legislative innovativeness.
5.3. Origins of Bad Governance in Sierra Leone
5.3.1. General Ideas about Patrimonialism
We now return to the Sierra Leone experience and ask: what do we know about
what causes patrimonialism? We ￿rst do this at a more general level and in the
next sub-section focus on how these general arguments apply in Sierra Leone.
There are two sides to this question, the supply of patrimonialism and the de-
mand. Almost the entire academic literature focuses on the supply side, namely
the circumstances under which patrimonialism is an attractive strategy for politi-
cians to use to stay in power. The demand side, the circumstances under which
citizens demand patronage instead of, say, public goods, is neglected though may
be important.
There are some basic ideas about what causes the supply of patrimonialism.
First, it seems to be attractive in circumstances where national identities are lack-
ing and there is no a settled social contract or legitimate structure of authority
in the country. This was obviously quite a common circumstance in Africa af-
ter independence where countries inherited the arbitrary boundaries created by
European colonialism.19 Though we do not have good analytical models of this,
Zolberg’s (1966) insights about ‘creating political order’ still seem germane to-
day. Patrimonialism may have great social costs but it is a very e￿ective way of
governing in a ￿ssiparous nation.
Second, patrimonialism seems to be encouraged by heterogeneity of identities.
There seem to be a few reasons for this. One is that patrimonialism heavily uses
various forms of divide and rule and this strategy appears to be much more feasi-
19As Englebert (2000) has shown the arbitrariness of a country’s boundaries in Africa are
correlated with poor development outcomes.
29ble in societies have distinct ascriptive identities (Padr￿ o-i-Miquel, 2007). Another,
stems from the demand side. In a very heterogeneous society there may be much
less demand for public goods, which reduces the opportunity cost of the massive
under-supply of public goods which is the natural by-product of patrimonialism.
Another facilitating factor on the demand side may stem from the fact that in
a society divided by ascriptive di￿erences it is easy to conceive of a polarization
between di￿erent groups which may lead people to be disposed to reject the ap-
plication of universal rules, so undermining principles which would impede the
creation of patrimonialism. Heterogeneity of identities also seems to make it more
di￿cult to establish civilian control of the military. When the military cannot be
relied on it becomes very di￿cult to establish such key state functions as monop-
olizing violence and this again makes patrimonialism more attractive as a method
of political control (see Horowitz, 1985, on how civilian control of the military is
fraught in ethnically divided societies).
The third potent source of patrimonialism seems to be a type of path depen-
dence from the institutional structure and operation of the colonial state. A large
amount of recent empirical and historical work has emphasized the path dependent
in￿uence of colonial institutions (e.g. Engerman and Sokolo￿, 1997, Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson, 2001), and this work resonates with arguments made by
Africanists. Cooper (2002), for example, coins the term ‘gate-keeper state’ to refer
to the institutions the Europeans created. They built governing centers on the
coasts and constructed infrastructure and institutions only to the extent that this
was needed to extract valuable resources or provide the thinnest veneer of order.
Cooper’s argument suggests that center-periphery relations in post-independent
African states were heavily in￿uenced by the structure of the colonial state. Young
(1994) speci￿cally argues that the political strategies adopted by post-colonial
African regimes were directly modelled on the way that colonial states functioned.
For example, indirect rule practiced in British colonies precipitated indirect rule
by post independent governments.20
20Many other types of arguments appear in the literature, for example patrimonialism is
linked to central traits of African indigenous political systems or maybe African political culture
(see Carlson, 1999). Another set of arguments involve the claim that patrimonialism is more
30It is also possible to make path dependent arguments about the creation of
state institutions more generally. The institution on indirect rule was the antithe-
sis of the construction of e￿ective central state institutions and the development
of what Mann (1986) calls ‘infrastructural power’. Indirect rule was not a strategy
for building state institutions, rather it was a minimum cost way of creating order
which gave up the desire of ‘penetrating’ society so as to provide public goods
or structure public life, in order to focus on resource extraction. As Fanthorpe
(2005, p. 4) points out in the case of Sierra Leone,
\even today, the vast majority of rural Sierra Leoneans obtain pri-
mary rights of residence, land use, and political/legal representation
as ‘natives’ of chiefdoms rather than as citizens of the state."
Here the academic literature builds ￿rmly on the work of those like Hintze
(1975) and Tilly (1975, 1990) who studied the development of central state in-
stitutions in Europe. These scholars emphasized how ￿scal and tax institutions,
bureaucracy and political institutions such as parliaments evolved out of the de-
sire of states to raise resources to ￿ght inter-state wars. Herbst (2000) and Bates
(2001) speci￿cally attribute the poor capacity of African states to the absence of
the historical factors that led to them in Europe. To these scholars, as to Max
Weber, patrimonialism was the natural state of a￿airs before the creation of states
and \rational-legal authority" and it sees no natural tendency for patrimonialism
to change without external challenges.21
Though the deep roots of the phenomenon are therefore complex, what is
clear is that the strategy is complementary to certain types of political institu-
tions. Throughout Africa, the creation of patrimonial rule went hand in hand with
changes in political institutions. This involved a strengthening of the executive
attractive when countries are ‘resource dependent.’ Unfortunately, resource dependence is hard
to measure in an objective way since economic decline will naturally lead a country to become
resource dependent, at least if measured by the share of natural resources in GDP or exports
(see Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006, for this point).
21Herbst (2000) and Bates (2001) tend to emphasize ‘fundamentals’ such as population density
and resource endowments as the main reason for the lack of incentives to build states, rather
than the institutional inheritance of colonialism.
31which was achieved by a move away from parliamentary to presidential constitu-
tions. One can think of several reasons why being a president was more attractive
than being a prime minister for politicians such as Stevens, but there seems to be
a natural a￿nity between presidentialism and patrimonialism. It also involved a
reduction in accountability which was implemented by the suspension of democ-
racy. During the consolidation of patrimonialism power was also concentrated in
the central state and capital city.
5.3.2. The Sierra Leonean Context
Some of these ideas obviously apply to Sierra Leone. Like most Sub-Saharan
African countries Sierra Leone was ‘arbitrary’ and, the Western Areas aside, made
up of a patchwork of di￿erent pre-colonial states and polities with di￿erent lan-
guages, histories and cultures. At independence, there was probably little notion
of a national identity or agreed rules for structuring the contest for power and
this no doubt led di￿erent groups to perceive that the stakes were very high.
Sierra Leone also seems to ￿t well with ideas of the gate-keeper state’ centered
on Freetown and of course the Protectorate was ruled indirectly through a system
of chiefs institutionalized by the British in the 1890s.22
Civilian control of the military was also highly problematic and Sierra Leone
even appears as a case study in Horowitz (1985) of a society where the colonial
military recruitment policies gave post-independent civilian governments severe
problems. For instance the British recruited primarily from the South of the
country and this is one of the reasons why the Mende dominated o￿cer corps op-
posed the election of the APC in 1967 and mounted a coup to block the transfer of
power. Though Stevens quickly moved to replace Mende o￿cers with northerners,
his primary strategy was to emasculate the military, something which proved a
disaster when the RUF invaded.
This being said, the intensity of patrimonialism in Sierra Leone might not
have been anticipated in 1961. For one, unlike most Sub-saharan African coun-
tries it actually had a national language, Krio, something which is associated
22See Migdal (1988) for an analysis of indirect rule and its’ consequences in Sierra Leone.
32with political stability in Tanzania, or with very good development outcomes in
Botswana.23 Second, though there were distinct ethnicities in Sierra Leone, these
were not based on the type of socioeconomic di￿erences seen in Rwanda or Bu-
rundi and at no point does the civil war seem to have degenerated into anything
approximating an ‘ethnic con￿ict.’24 Herbst (2000) even classi￿es Sierra Leone
into one of the rare African countries with ‘easy’ political geography based on its’
small size and distribution of population.
Despite these advantages there seem to have been some other factors that may
have exacerbated the intensity of patrimonialism in the country. Most commonly
cited is not the extent of natural resources but the form. It is widely observed that
the alluvial nature of diamonds and their wide spread across the country makes
it very di￿cult for the state to control diamond mining. This breeds illegality,
smuggling and evasion and as Clapham (2003, p. 12) puts it
\a situation highly unconducive to the maintenance of legal norms and
bureaucratic state structures".
It seems quite likely that the failure of the British colonial state and post-
independence governments to bring the diamond mining economy under the con-
trol of formal state institutions helped to stimulate di￿erent ways to control it
and extract wealth from it. The contrast with the deep mined capital intensive
diamonds of Botswana is interesting.25
Another factor often quoted in favor of Sierra Leonean distinctiveness is an
undertow of socioeconomic and political con￿icts possibly missing in most African
23Though of course there is Somalia and Rwanda as well.
24Indeed though Humphreys and Weinstein’s (2008) data shows that being Mende does predict
membership in the RUF, this e￿ect comes only from those who were coerced into joining the
movement. This e￿ect almost certainly stems from the fact that the RUF began in the south
of the country, which is more explained by the location of Liberia and Charles Taylor than
anything else.
25Mentioning Botswana, one might ask why the factors we have discussed here did not lead to
patrimonialism in Botswana, and one salient success story in Sub-Saharan Africa. As Parsons
and Robinson (2006) discuss, the historical pattern of institutional creation and governance in
Botswana was rather unique both before, during and after the colonial experience. They show
how the economic success of Botswana can be explained by the absence of the forces here we
suggest lead to patrimonialism.
33countries. For example, Richards (1996), Sawyer (2004) and Fanthorpe (2005) see
historical roots of the civil war stemming from inegalitarian patterns of access to
land and resources and many have written about the extent of ‘gerontocracy’ in
Sierra Leone and the grievances this created amongst young men. It is possible
that the existence of a large strata of disillusioned young men also facilitated
the creation of patrimonialism since excluded from local resources, they may have
valued very highly what rents were on o￿er from the political patrons in Freetown.
It may also have been that an added incentive to undermine the bureaucracy
and create a shadow state’ in the post independence period came from the fact that
the state inherited from the colonial powers was dominated by Krios, while politics
was dominated by people and interests from the former protectorate (Clapham,
2003, p. 12).
Finally, one could also argue that the fact that the Mende and the Temne,
each with about 30% of the population, formed the basis of the two main political
parties gave politics a type of ‘polarized structure’ in the sense of Esteban and
Ray (1994) which may have been very conducive to con￿ict.
6. Improving Governance
Our discussion in this paper has embedded the discussion of governance into the
political economy of institutions and development. Our basic argument is that bad
governance arises because it distributes income and or political power in particular
ways. To improve governance we need to understand the political forces that lead
to bad governance in the ￿rst place and we also need to understand how and why
governance improves. These questions are closely related to more general ones
about the processes that lead to institutional persistence and change. Institutions
persist when the incentives and structures of power that led to them also persist.
It is clear that even though there is a great deal of persistence of institutions in
the world, institutions do change. The approach we have taken in this chapter
suggests that this will happen when the political equilibrium changes.
Nevertheless, at present we do not have a satisfactory understanding of the cir-
cumstances under which dysfunctional political equilibria arise and sustain them-
34selves. A natural idea would be to focus on speci￿c political institutions such as
democracy. Yet we know that democracy per se is not necessarily associated with
better development outcomes and we all know the famous examples of ‘develop-
mental dictatorships’ such as in South Korea or Taiwan. However, as yet, we do
not understand why some dictatorships are developmental and others not or why,
for instance, there has never been a developmental dictatorship in Sub-Saharan
Africa or Latin America.
Though we cannot yet say under what circumstances political equilibria which
lead to economic growth will arise, we can illustrate the utility of the ideas we have
developed by examining the issue of governance and institutional reform. If gov-
ernance is poor then a natural approach is to directly try to reform governance. If
there is corruption, then promote an anti-corruption law, set up an anti-corruption
agency, make aid conditional on eliminating corruption. The potential problems
facing such an approach highlight the ￿rst set of pitfalls of reform. Our perspec-
tive emphasizes that one should not try to understand or manipulate governance
without thinking about the political forces that created the particular patterns of
governance that we observe.
Indeed, we shall argue that direct governance reform in itself is unlikely to
be e￿ective and that instead it might be more useful to focus on understanding
and reforming the forces that make governance bad. It is therefore important to
focus on political institutions and the distribution of political power in thinking
about reform. This raises the second potential pitfall of governance reform; while
we have recognized the importance of political institutions, we are still at the
beginning of understanding the complex relationship between political institutions
and the political equilibrium and thus governance. Sometimes changing political
institutions may be insu￿cient, or even counterproductive, in leading to better
economic outcomes.
The pitfalls of reform are related to the fact that patterns of relative economic
performance are very persistent. Examining the pitfalls of reform is one way of
approaching this issue. We then move to examining successful change.
We begin our discussion by focusing at more length on whether reforming
governance without thinking about politics is likely to be e￿ective. We argue
35that such reforms may not work if they do not change the political equilibrium.
We then examine if these pitfalls of reform can be solved by reforming political
institutions (thus altering the distribution of de jure power in society). We argue
that this may not work either because de facto power may persist and may over-
ride the e￿ects of reforms to political institutions. From this it might seem to
follow that a successful reform necessitates changes in both de jure and de facto
power. We show that simultaneously changing both may not achieve real reform
either because the political equilibrium may be path dependent.
6.1. Persistence of Power and Incentives|The Seesaw E￿ect
Many poor growth experiences are accompanied by a system of dysfunctional
laws and regulations and other aspects of governance. An obvious idea might
be to directly intervene in these components of governance and promote change
in laws and regulations. This was the sort of reasoning that led to the famous
Washington consensus some of whose components, for example, privatization of
state enterprises, deregulation, and legal security for property rights all seem
related to governance.
The ￿rst pitfall of reform is that directly reforming speci￿c institutions, policies
or aspects of governance may not be su￿cient, and may even back￿re. The
reason why such reforms may be ine￿ective is that it is usually not a coincidence
that some aspect of governance is bad. Bad governance is probably ful￿lling
some political objective. But there are many di￿erent ways and a multitude
of instruments to achieve a speci￿c goal. Taking away one instrument without
altering the balance of power in society or the basic political equilibrium can
simply lead to the replacement of one instrument by another with little net e￿ect
of the ultimate goal - economic performance. This phenomena was dubbed the
See-Saw E￿ect by Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen (2003).
6.1.1. Case Study: Central Bank Independence
Acemoglu, Johnson, Querub￿ ￿n and Robinson (2008) use the case of central bank
independence (CBI) to illustrate these ideas about reform. CBI is a canonical
36example of a reform in governance which was proposed as a way to improve
monetary policy. It is a particularly interesting type of reform to study empirically
since it has a clearly delineated target - in￿ation - and one can thus judge the
success of CBI by investigating whether or not it has reduced in￿ation. Acemoglu
et al. (2008), in the spirit of the argument above, argue that the impact of reform
will be conditional on the initial political equilibrium that generated the need for
reform. For example, only policy reforms that the groups with political power
cannot easily over-ride, circumvent or ignore are likely to achieve their objectives.
In consequence, in many countries, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, where
there are only few constraints and checks on politicians and on politically powerful
groups, policy reform is unlikely to be very e￿ective. Case study evidence for this
is presented in van de Walle (2001, see also his 1993 paper) who illustrates that
for African politicians (2001, p. 13)
\restoring economic stability and growth has often taken a back
seat in government motivations to preserving political power."
In the context of structural adjustment he argues (2001, p. 76)
\Often, the policies have changed on paper, but in practice, some-
thing resembling the status quo ante continues to prevail. In some
cases, the old policies were reinstated under a new name or with some
new policy objective ... In other cases, governments ignore the spirit
of their own liberalization e￿orts by continuing to interfere in o￿cially
deregulated markets."
Put starkly, who would expect policy reform to have signi￿cant e￿ects in Zim-
babwe as long as Robert Mugabe is in power? As an illustration of this Figure
15 plots the in￿ation rate in Zimbabwe and plots a vertical line in 1995 when the
central bank’s act was modi￿ed in order to grant the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
more independence. Clearly, the independence of the Central Bank in Zimbabwe
did little to restraint the subsequent monetary policy of the government. There-
fore, a major reason why policy reform will often fail is because of the absence of
37a functioning accountability system and lack of constraints and checks on politi-
cians.
Acemoglu et al. (2008) point out, however that this does not imply that better
political institutions and transparency always increase the impact of reforms. In
particular, we would not expect societies with a functioning system of accountabil-
ity and with checks on politicians to be those pursuing such highly distortionary
policies. For example, in￿ation was already low in the United Kingdom in the
1990s, before the central bank became independent in 1998 and in consequence
the potential for a large e￿ect from CBI reform is limited.
The arguments in the previous two paragraphs suggest that once we take
a political economy perspective, there should be a non-monotonic relationship
between the extent of constraints on politicians and the impact of policy reform.
Acemoglu et al. (2008) then test these ideas using cross-national panel data.
They ￿nd that CBI has little e￿ect on in￿ation in countries with either high
or low values of constraints on the executive, but it does signi￿cantly reduce
in￿ation in countries with intermediate values of constraints. However, they also
hypothesize that if policy reform does not change the political equilibrium, reform
in one dimension can lead to simultaneous disreform in another dimension. They
test this idea by examining whether or not CBI leads to a deterioration in ￿scal
policy. They indeed ￿nd some evidence that while in countries with high or low
constraints on the executive CBI has no impact on ￿scal policy, for countries with
intermediate levels of constraints it tends to increase the size of the government
relative to GDP. This is a precise instance of the see-saw e￿ect. We illustrate
this idea in Figure 16 with two ￿gures from their paper which plot for Argentina
and Colombia in￿ation and government expenditure as a % of GDP. Again the
introduction of CBI is indicated by a vertical line. The ￿gures suggest that while
CBI reduced in￿ation, it also coincided with a large expansion in the size of the
government relative to the economy.
386.1.2. General Lessons
Making or imposing speci￿c reforms may have little impact on the general struc-
ture of governance or performance if they leave untouched the underlying political
equilibrium. Of course, it is possible that a reform in governance may induce a
change in power and ultimately in the broader political equilibrium. Nevertheless,
as the above example make clear, this is far from certain.
Despite all of the Washington consensus reforms that took place in Argentina,
for example, there was little change in the way politics worked. The political ge-
nius of Menem and the Peronist party after 1989 was to recognize that the policies
of the Washington consensus could be bent to function as ‘politics as usual’. In
consequence there was little change in the underlying political equilibrium though
the instruments which the Peronists used after 1989 were di￿erent. Though it is
possible that such reforms could change the political equilibrium, it did not hap-
pen and this is why the Washington Consensus led to such disappointing results.
6.2. Persistence of De Facto Power
The last section illustrated that reforming particular parts of governance without
perturbing the underlying political equilibrium may not lead to improved economic
performance. Moreover, we shall now argue that even reforming de jure power
(for instance enfranchising former slaves) or introducing democracy may not be
su￿cient to induce broader institutional change. The reason why changes in de
jure power may not be su￿cient to trigger a change in the political equilibrium
is that the political and economic system is kept in place by a combination of
de jure and de facto political power. An external or internal reform of de jure
institutions may still leave the sources of de facto power intact, and groups that
have lost their de jure power may use their de facto power in order to re-create
a system similar to the one that has departed (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008a).
The new system may be as ine￿cient as the old one.
This is not to argue that reform of de jure institutions is not possible or that it
is irrelevant. For example, democratization in many European societies in the 19th
century appears to have signi￿cantly changed economic institutions, for example
39leading to sustained expansions of educational systems (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2000, Lindert, 2004). It is to argue however that reform comes with pitfalls and as
yet we have an incomplete understanding of the circumstances under which such
reforms will succeed.
An excellent illustration of these ideas is the evolution of institutions in the
US South after the Civil War. Our discussion follows Acemoglu and Robinson
(2008b).
6.2.1. Case Study: The US South before and after the Civil War
An important example which illustrates our perspective is the continuation of the
economic system based on labor repression, plantation and low-wage uneducated
labor in the U.S. South before and after the signi￿cant changes in institutions
brought about by the Civil War. Most obviously these changes in de jure power
included the enfranchisement of the freed slaves.
Before the Civil War, the South was signi￿cantly poorer than the U.S. average
income at about 70% of GDP per-capita. The South lacked industry (Wright,
1986, Table 2.4, p. 27) and in 1860 the total manufacturing output of the South
was less than that of either Pennsylvania, New York or Massachusetts (Cobb, 1984,
p. 6). The South had very low rates of urbanization (around 9% as opposed to 35%
in the Northeast) and relatively little investment in infrastructure. For example,
the density of railroads (miles of track divided by land area) was three times higher
in the North than in Southern states. The situation with respect to canal mileage
was similar (Wright, Table 2.1, p. 21). Perhaps more importantly, especially
in the context of the potential for future economic growth and industrialization,
the South was not even innovative for the sectors in which it specialized. The
relatively backwardness of the South was due the planation economy and slavery.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the income per-capita of the South fell to
about 50% of the U.S. average. If the organization of the slave economy had been
the reason why the South had been relatively backward in 1865, one might have
imagined that the abolition of slavery in 1865 would have removed this blockage
to Southern prosperity. The evidence and historical interpretations show that the
40abolition of slavery had a surprisingly small e￿ect on the Southern economy. Out
of the ashes of the Civil War emerged a low wage labor intensive economy based
on labor repression. Cut o￿ from the rest of the United States, income per-capita
remained at about half the average until the 1940s when it ￿nally began slowly
to converge. Just as before the Civil War, there was systematic underinvestment
in education (Margo, 1990).
So why did the economic system of the South change so little following the
Civil War, especially given the signi￿cant changes in political institutions? At
￿rst, this persistence appears at odds with the signi￿cant changes in the distrib-
ution of de jure power that took place after the Civil War, for example, with the
enfranchisement of the freed slaves, and the repeal of the Missouri compromise,
which had previously cemented the political power of the South in the federal
government.
We argue that this persistence is due to the exercise of de facto political power
by the Southern landed elites to compensate for the loss of their de jure political
power. There was considerable persistence in the identity and power of these
elites. For example, Wiener (1978) studied the persistence of the planter elite in
5 counties of the black belt of western Alabama. Tracking families from the U.S.
census and considering those with at least $10,000 of real estate, he found that (p.
9) \of the 236 members of the planter elite in 1850, 101 remained in the elite in
1870." Interestingly, this rate of persistence was very similar to that experienced
in the antebellum period; \of the 236 wealthiest planters families of 1850, only
110 remained in the elite a decade later" (p. 9). Nevertheless, \of the 25 planters
with the largest landholdings in 1870, 18 (72%) had been in the elite families in
1860; 16 had been in the 1850 elite group."
After the end of the Civil War, more or less the same group of planter elites
controlled the land and used various instruments to re-exert their control over the
labor force. Though the speci￿c economic institution of slavery did not persist,
the evidence shows a clear line of persistence in the economic system of the South
based on plantation-type agriculture with cheap labor. This economic system was
maintained through a variety of channels, including both control of local politics
and exercise of potentially violent de facto power. As a consequence, in the words
41of W.E.B. Du Bois (1903, p. 88), the South became \simply an armed camp for
intimidating black folk."
A key to the persistence of the antebellum system after the Civil War was the
continued control over land. For example, in the debate over the redistribution of
40 acres of land to the freedmen (vetoed by President Andrew Johnson in 1865),
Congressman George Washington Julian argued (quoted in Wiener, 1978, p. 6):
\Of what avail would be an act of congress totally abolishing slavery ...
if the old agricultural basis of aristocratic power shall remain?"
Southern elites were able to disenfranchise blacks after 1877 and a whole gamut
of segregationist legislation|the so-called Jim Crow laws|was enacted (Wood-
ward, 1955, for the classic analysis). These laws turned the postbellum South into
an e￿ective \apartheid" society where blacks and whites lived di￿erent lives. As
in South Africa, these laws were aimed at controlling the black population and
its labor supply. Consequently, the South entered the 20th century as a primar-
ily rural society. \It remained an agrarian society with a backward technology
that still employed hand labor and mule power virtually unassisted by mechan-
ical implements" Ransom and Sutch (2001 pp. 175-176). In 1900, the South’s
urbanization rate was 13.5%, as compared to 60% in the Northeast (Cobb, 1984,
p. 25).
Ransom and Sutch’s (2001, p. 186) assessment of the implications of this
economic and political system in the South for economic progress is representative
of the consensus view: \Southerners erected an economic system that failed to
reward individual initiative on the part of blacks and was therefore ill-suited to
their economic advancement. As a result, the inequities originally inherited from
slavery persisted. But there was a by-product of this e￿ort at racial repression,
the system tended to cripple all economic growth":
All in all, the Southern equilibrium, based on the exercise of de facto power
by the landed elite, plantation agriculture and low-wage, uneducated labor, per-
sisted well into the 20th century, and only started to crumble after World War II.
Interestingly, it was only after the demise of this Southern equilibrium, that the
South started its process of rapid convergence to the North.
426.2.2. General Lessons
Just as reforming governance or economic institutions without changing the po-
litical equilibrium may not improve economic performance, so changing de jure
power, while leaving the sources of de facto power intact, may have little impact.
In the US South, the same economic system based on the repression of labor got
reinstituted after Reconstruction. Even though the enfranchisement of the freed
slaves meant that there had been a change in de jure power, and after the Civil
War blacks exercised this power and voted in large numbers, southern elites were
able to use their de facto power to re-assert control over labor and eventually
by the 1890s disenfranchise the blacks. The persistence of de facto power was
facilitated by the fact that white elites had kept hold of the land after the Civil
War, and because these elites had avoided being killed during the Civil War and
still had a huge comparative advantage over blacks in the ability to engage in
collective action. Control was exercised via coercion, lynching and the Ku Klux
Klan and other extra-legal methods and eventually institutionalized via control
of state legislatures.
The general lesson seems to be that change in institutions which a￿ects the
distribution of de jure political power, needs to be complemented by changes in
the sources of de facto political power of the elite and reductions in the bene￿ts
that political incumbents have in intensifying their use of de facto political power.
6.3. The Iron Law of Oligarchy
The conclusion from the last section seems to be that to change the political
equilibrium there needs to be changes in both de jure and de facto power. For
instance, if there is an elite which is structuring institutions to its bene￿t with
adverse aggregate e￿ects, then to engineer a transition to a better equilibrium
both their de jure and de facto power must be simultaneously reformed.
Unfortunately, things are not quite so simple as this. This is because even if de
jure and de facto power changes, those who acquire the power in the new political
equilibrium may not have the correct incentives either. More importantly, their
incentives to use their power and the institutions they ￿nd it optimal to create
43may be fundamentally shaped by the status quo they replace - they may be path
dependent. If an elite with power is initially structuring economic institutions or
the nature of governance to extract rents from society, then the very fact that it is
doing this may induce a new elite to do likewise. The replacement of one elite by
another may therefore do little to improve economic performance. This pitfall is
reminiscent of the classic idea in sociology of an Iron Law of Oligarchy going back
to the work of Michels (1962), Mosca (1939) and Pareto (1968). This hypothesis
states that it is never possible to have real change in society because when new
groups mobilize or are created in the process of socioeconomic change they simply
replace pre-existing elites and groups and behave in qualitatively similar ways.
There seem to be many circumstances in which ‘Iron Law’ type behavior may
occur and there are quite possibly many mechanisms that can generate behavior
like this. We now present a case study of this phenomenon in action drawn from
Acemoglu and Robinson (2007).
6.3.1. Case Study: The Bolivian Revolution
Bolivia features centrally in accounts of comparative development in the Americas.
It was at the heart of the Inca Empire with a high density of indigenous peoples
and during the colonial period economic institutions designed to extract rents {
the encomienda, repartamiento, the Potos￿ ￿ mita (forced labor draft for the silver
mines) - were all central. Although the mita was abolished at independence a
highly inegalitarian and authoritarian society persisted. In 1950, for example,
6 % of landowners owned 92% of all lands and the smallest 60% of landowners
owned 0.2% and the tin mines which formed the basis of the export economy were
owned by three families. A mere 31% of the adult population was literate and
only 4% of labor force was employed in industry. Indians still subject to unpaid
pongueaje (personal services) for the landowners whose lands they worked (Klein,
1992, for an overview of this evidence).
The remains of this system were swept away by the Bolivian revolution of 1952
which was masterminded by the MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario),
a political party which had formed in urban areas in the 1940s to contest the power
44of the traditional elite. Following the Revolution, the MNR formed a government
which implemented land reform, expropriated large estates and redistributed them
to the labor force and Indian communities. It also introduced universal su￿rage
by abolishing literacy requirement on voting and nationalized the mines of the tin
barons.
These appear to be huge, radical institutional changes. In particular there
was a shift in the distribution of both de jure and de facto power. Surely Bolivia
was launched on a new path of institutional and economic development. At the
very least one would have anticipated a sustained fall in inequality. Unfortunately
none of these good outcomes occurred. Following the Revolution the 1950s saw
a failed attempt by MNR to create a one-party state and in the process they
re-built the military which had been disarmed in 1952. They were also able to
use clientelism to gain the support of the indigenous majority. Indeed, there are
striking comparisons between the traditional clientelism which had existed before
1952 and that which emerged during the regime of the MNR afterwards. In a
seminal study, Heath (1972), showed that although the identity of the patrons were
di￿erent and the instruments of clientelism had changed following the institutional
changes brought by 1952, there were very strong similarities in the basic structure
of the political equilibrium. Kelley and Klein (1981) estimated that 10 years after
the Revolution, inequality had returned to 1952 levels.
How can we understand an outcome like this? We believe that there are
mechanisms that can generate persistence in the political equilibrium even when
de jure and de facto power changes and can produce an Iron law of Oligarchy.
The idea is quite simple. Initially in Bolivia institutions were structured to the
bene￿t of traditional elites. A new elite emerged, spearheaded by the MNR. The
MNR needed to win support of the campesinos and other urban groups. To do
this they had to develop a political strategy, but the form that strategy took
was highly in￿uenced by the strategies being used by the traditional elite. The
traditional elite were clientelistic, so it was optimal to use clientelism to compete
with them. Similarly, the traditional elite ran a political system with few checks
and balances. Would the MNR ￿nd it optimal to create a political system with
checks and balances? Not necessarily. After all, though this might have appealed
45to citizens and garnered more support, it would also have been disadvantageous to
them once they were in power. Hence there is a well de￿ned trade-o￿. Indeed, the
MNR were able to attain power and create highly imperfect political institutions
which they were then able to undermine.
6.3.2. General Lessons
One might conclude from our discussion of the US South that the real problem was
the persistence of the elite and their resources. If only the North had implemented
land reform and given the freed slaves their 50 acres and a mule, as they had been
promised, everything would have been di￿erent. The example of the Bolivian
Revolution shows that the situation is more complex than this. In Bolivia the
previous elite were expropriated and their power taken away, yet the new elite
that emerged (the MNR) used strategies that were very similar to the old elite
and which had the same impact on economic institutions. Thus there can be huge
path dependence in political equilibria, even when de jure and de facto power
changes hands from one group to another. This implies that, for reformers, a
policy of changing political institutions and trying to simultaneously undermine
the de facto power of incumbents may not work. Instead, reformers must change
the incentives of new elites and de-couple their choices from those of the previous
elites.
6.4. Successful Reform
Though so far we have emphasized the problems of reform which result for the
political nature of poor governance, nevertheless there are many cases of improve-
ments in governance. To give a tangible example of the forces leading to insti-
tutional change let us return to the US South. Starting in the 1940s the income
per-capita of the US South began to convergence very rapidly to the US average.
This period saw the end of the isolation of the labor market. It saw the abolition
of institutionalized racial discrimination in labor markets and social life and the
re-enfranchisement of blacks culminating in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (see
Wright, 1999, for an overview).
46These changes were driven by a number of interacting forces which both
changed the ability of Southern elites to maintain the previous system and their
incentives to do so. The ability of whites to continue with the institutions which
had been in e￿ect since the late 19th century was severely undermined by the
fact that blacks in South ￿nally solved the collective action problem (McAdam,
1983). The civil rights movement made much of the previous system unenforce-
able. Black collective action was facilitated by the intervention of the federal
government. At the same time there was a much smaller ability and incentive for
the whites to continue to repress labor. Starting in the 1940s there had been a
huge out-migration of blacks from the South which could no longer be controlled.
At the same time technological change, particularly the mechanization of cotton
picking (Heinicke, 1994) made it far less important to repress labor.
There was real change therefore in the political equilibrium in the South which
led to much better governance and economic institutions. The old economy based
on extracting rents from the blacks crumbled, along with all the negative exter-
nalities that it had for other parts of the economy. No new elite arose to carry
on repressing black labor using di￿erent instruments and the situation did not
turn on its’ head with blacks extracting rents from whites. This may have been
because of the technological changes that took place at the same time, but more
likely it was because the South is embedded in a larger economy with well func-
tioning institutions. This latter feature of the South may have considerable raised
the opportunity cost of having bad economic institutions and is something which
obviously di￿erentiates it from Bolivia or the Congo.
Improved governance can therefore come about when changes in state vari-
ables or structural parameters in￿uence the costs and bene￿ts of di￿erent sets of
institutions, and thus change interests, or there is a change in the distribution of
political power. These changes are often endogenous to the system though often
in response to shocks. Nevertheless, policy interventions promoted by economists
and by external entities such as the World Bank can lead to sustained reform by
working on any of these margins. An obvious example of this are the institutional
and governance reforms precipitated in Eastern Europe by the carrot of accession
to the European Union. This created enormous ￿nancial incentives to reform.
476.5. Governance and Equity|The Scandinavian Model
Though better governance may have arisen in Britain in the 17th century as the
consequence of a political revolution (Pincus, 2009), in the US South governance
improved as the joint outcome both of economic and political changes. Though
people certainly refer to the ‘Civil Rights Revolution’ in the US, one does not need
a revolution to change the political equilibrium and indeed, as the Iron Law of
Oligarchy emphasizes, revolutions may simply replace one dysfunctional equilibria
with another. It is possible that just changes in the economic environment, in
technology or in the organization of markets can permanently change the political
equilibrium and this is no doubt what Karl Marx had in mind when he observed
that \the windmill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam mill, society
with the industrial capitalist" (see also White, 1962). We illustrate this possibility
with an in depth case study of the emergence and persistence of the Scandinavian
model of capitalism.
6.5.1. The Rise of the Scandinavian Model
Social Democratic governments came to power in Sweden and Norway in the midst
of the Great Depression committed to reducing unemployment and alleviating
poverty. The main slogan of the social democrats in the thirties was employ-
ment for everybody. Both governments increased spending on policies such as
unemployment bene￿ts, public housing and agricultural price supports. In ret-
rospect, the key innovation was not the crisis policies that were adopted in the
1930s, but the institutional response to the problem that threatened the recovery
program (Moene and Wallerstein, 2006): What would keep the increased govern-
ment spending from raising the wages of insiders in the labor market, rather than
increasing employment?
The problem came to a head in both countries in the construction industry.
Construction workers in Sweden and Norway were highly paid, militant and shel-
tered from foreign competition. When foreign demand collapsed in the 1930s,
workers in the export sectors such as metal workers accepted large wage reduc-
tions in order to stem the decline of employment. Construction workers came
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on housing. Since construction workers were employed in the export sector as well
as in home construction, higher construction wages raised labor costs in the ex-
port sector, which threatened the jobs of metalworkers. When construction unions
called a strike in support of higher wages, the national confederation of unions
intervened to force the strike to an early and from the construction workers’ point
of view, unsuccessful conclusion.
The intervention of the national union confederation to end the strikes in con-
struction was the initial step in a process of centralization of authority within the
union movement in both Norway and Sweden, a process that was encouraged and
supported by employers. \Basic agreements" between the national associations of
unions and employers establishing rules for collective bargaining at the industry-
level were reached in 1935 in Norway and 1938 in Sweden. In the 1950s, (1956 in
Sweden, 1958 in Norway), bargaining at the industry level was replaced by direct
negotiations over pay by the national associations of unions and employers. As
white-collar and professional union confederations joined the centralized negoti-
ations, the coverage of the central agreements expanded to include most of the
working population in the private sector.
The central agreements were necessarily general. The details of how the agree-
ment were to be implemented was decided by subsequent bargaining at the in-
dustry and local level. Once the central agreement was signed, however, work
stoppages were illegal. Wage increases at the local level were limited to what
could be obtained without the threat of a strike. The centralized system of wage
setting, which reached its zenith in the 1970s, had three important consequences.
The ￿rst was the virtual elimination of industrial con￿ict. From the countries
with the highest levels of strikes and lockouts in the world in the inter-war year,
Norway and Sweden became countries with some of the lowest levels of industrial
con￿ict in the postwar period.
The second consequence was to allow conditions in the export industries to
determine the growth of wages throughout the economy. This implied wage mod-
eration. In practice, the centralized system of wage bargaining tied wage growth
throughout the economy to the growth of wages in the export sector, since the
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most in￿uential unions within the national confederations.
The third consequence of centralized wage setting was a gradual process of
wage compression that, over time, generated the most egalitarian distribution of
wages and salaries in the capitalist world. In the 1950s, wage compression was
adopted as an explicit goal of the unions in both Norway and Sweden under the
title of \solidaristic bargaining."
Solidaristic bargaining was defended more in terms of e￿ciency than in terms
of equity. In the 1950s, two Swedish trade union economists, G￿ osta Rehn and
Rudolf Meidner (Rehn, 1952), argued that equalizing wages across Swedish ￿rms
and industries would promote economic development by forcing wages up in low-
productivity ￿rms or industries and keeping wages down in high-productivity ￿rms
or industries. By reducing pro￿ts in low-productivity ￿rms and increasing prof-
its in high-productivity ￿rms, labor and capital would be induced (or coerced)
to move from low productive to high productive activities, increasing aggregate
e￿ciency as well as improving equality (Moene and Wallerstein 1997, Agell and
Lommerud, 1993).
Whatever the bene￿ts of solidaristic bargaining in terms of e￿ciency, the cu-
mulative impact on the distribution of wages and salaries was large. In Sweden
between 1970, when comprehensive wage data on individuals began to be col-
lected, and 1983, when the system of centralized bargaining temporarily collapsed,
the variance of the log of hourly wages among private sector blue-collar workers
declined by over 50 per cent (Hibbs and Locking, 2000). That dramatic decrease
does not include the equally prominent reduction of the wage di￿erential between
blue-collar and white-collar workers. Hibbs and Locking (2000) estimate that a
similar decline occurred during the 1960s as well, implying that the variance of
log hourly wages in 1983 was only one quarter of what it was in 1960. In 2003, the
ratio of the wage for a worker at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution to
the wage for a worker at the 10th percentile was about 2 to 1 in Sweden, Norway
and Denmark, the lowest ratios of any country in the OECD. In contrast, the
90-10 ratio was above 5 to 1 in the US in 2003.
To keep highly productive employers from undermining the policy of wage re-
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monitor at the central level), the Swedish employers’ confederation lobbied the
government to nationalize the provision of health care and pensions (Swenson,
2002). Moene and Wallerstein (2001) show that expenditures on social insurance
against the loss of income due to unemployment, disability, sickness and occu-
pational injury rises as wage inequality declines. If insurance is a normal good,
a policy that raises the income of the majority of workers with below average
incomes increases the political demand for social insurance policies. The com-
pression of wage di￿erentials, in sum, had far-reaching economic and political
consequences, one of which, was to increase the pace of economic development. It
introduced a system of governance and incentives that led private businesses to
act in socially desirable ways without altering property rights.
6.5.2. How Equality Multiplies
Today the societal model of the Scandinavian countries is still distinguished by
a large welfare state, encompassing unions and employers associations, and a
governance system of routine consultation among government and representatives
for interest organizations. In terms of policy it is characterized by the provision
of basic goods for everybody as a right of citizenship; a government committed to
full employment; and wage leveling through \solidaristic bargaining" (Moene and
Wallerstein, 1993).
From a governance point of view it is important to notice that these insti-
tutional arrangements are complementary. The impact of one of them tends to
strengthen the impact of others. Governance is easier and more e￿cient whenever
institutions and policies ￿t together in this manner. A policy for full employment,
for instance, requires wage moderation by the unions. For union members to
accept that their union bosses negotiate wage moderation, they must face credi-
ble promises of a full employment policy. Thus the unions rely on a government
commitment to full employment in their wage moderation policies as much as the
government relies on union wage moderation in its policy for full employment.
The complementarity between social spending and wage setting is a related
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demonstrate how economic and social equality multiplies due to the complemen-
tarity between wage determination and welfare spending. Returning once more
to the mechanism that Toqueville hinted at, we have that (A) a more equal wage
distribution fuels welfare generosity via political competition, while (B) a more
generous welfare state fuels wage equality further via its support to weak groups
in the labor market.
Together the equality magnifying e￿ect (A) and the wage equalizing e￿ect (B)
generate a cumulative process that adds up to a sizable social multiplier. Using
data on 18 OECD countries over the period 1976-2002, Barth and Moene (2008)
are able to identify an equality multiplier of more than 50 per cent. Any exogenous
change in either welfare spending or wage setting is thus magni￿ed by 50 per cent
by endogenous forces caused by social complementarity. This equality multiplier
helps explain why almost equally rich countries di￿er so much in the economic
and social equality that they o￿er their citizens: With only one third of the pre-
tax inequality of the US, the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden have twice as generous welfare spending as the US.
These calculations are based on a political economic equilibrium approach that
incorporates the mutual dependence between the governance of labor markets and
the governance of social policies. While social welfare spending depends on the
wage dispersion in the labor market, it also feeds back to the determination of this
wage dispersion. The political economic equilibrium outcome is a wage dispersion
and a level of welfare spending that are consistent taking the mutual feed-backs
into account. Hence, the new political economic equilibrium gives \new maxims
to those who govern and particular habits to the governed," as Toqueville said.
These are examples of how certain policies, institutions and governance sys-
tems ￿t together and strengthen each other. In the long run, the outcomes may
look as if societal arrangements come in packages with di￿erent social and eco-
nomic organization.
526.5.3. How the Political Equilibrium Changed
The Scandinavian model was not the result of intelligent design, but rather of
social, economic and political evolution. One of the central groups who supported
solidaristic bargaining were the employers (Swenson 1989, 1991). While the Nordic
countries are well known the strength of unions, employers also achieved an ex-
traordinary level of organization. Employers much preferred to bargain with the
\sensible" leadership of the union confederations, rather than with the militant
leadership of the shop ￿oor union bodies.
The other important group that supported the policy of wage compression
was the leadership of unions of low-wage workers. Since the union movement
was encompassing, both low and high wage earners had in￿uence in union policy.
While the policy of wage compression was controversial in unions of high-wage
workers, it was enthusiastically supported by unions of low-wage workers. Thus,
the political coalition that prevailed in the 1950s and established the pattern
of centralized and solidaristic bargaining that was to last until the 1980s was
comprised of the low-wage unions and employers.
High-wage unions were prevented from leaving the centralized negotiations by
the threat of lockouts. It is unlikely that the low-wage unions and the leadership
of the union confederation would have been able to force the high-wage unions to
accept an egalitarian wage policy without the backing of employers and the threat
of lockouts against recalcitrant unions.
Many critics would claim that Scandinavian model is only possible in con-
sensual, homogeneous and a￿uent societies with an extraordinary commitment
to equality. The most common explanations for the Scandinavian experience
thus circle around variations of Scandinavian exceptionalism, emphasizing the im-
portance of social homogeneity (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote 2002), a Nordic
commitment to equality (Therborn 1986), a consensual model of decision-making
(Wilensky 2002) and a￿uence. In third world countries that are con￿ict-ridden,
heterogeneous and poor, the model is deemed infeasible. But conditions in Nor-
way and Sweden in the period preceding the social democratic ascent to power
were anything but consensual, egalitarian and a￿uent.
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levels of industrial con￿ict in the world. In Norway the number of working days
lost in strikes and lockouts in one year{1931{was three times larger than the total
number of working days lost in industrial con￿ict the 25-year period 1945 to 1970.
Nowhere else were employers as ready as employers were in Norway and Sweden
to ￿ght the unions with lockouts.
The consensus between employers and unions that characterized social democ-
racy after the war was nowhere to be seen when the Social Democrats entered gov-
ernment in the 1930s. While the Nordic countries were relatively homogeneous in
terms of religion and language, the working population was far from homogenous
in terms of living conditions. In particular, the social and economic cleavages
between rural and urban residents were striking. Measured by income per capita,
the gap between the poorest and richest rural municipalities was 1 to 14. (Falk
and Tovmo, 2000).
Scandinavian social democrats came to power in societies no less economically
divided than many poor countries of today. As in developing countries today,
there was signi￿cant underutilization of labor. Surplus labor in the form of open
unemployment was most evident. In addition, there was disguised unemployment
in the countryside that may have been as signi￿cant as open unemployment in
the cities. Around half of the population lived in sparsely populated areas where
most made a living from farming and ￿shing.
Finally, the economies that the social democrats inherited in the 1930s were
far from a￿uent. The real per capita GDP of Sweden and Norway when the social
democrats entered government was far below the current real per capita GDP of
middle-income countries like Brazil or South Africa. The majority of citizens in
Scandinavia became rich under the Scandinavian model of governance, not before.
Consensus, homogeneity, and a￿uence are products of the Scandinavian gover-
nance, not prerequisites. Nevertheless, skeptics have from the beginning doubted
the long-run feasibility of a governance structure that combines market e￿ciency
with social equality. In 1899 Rosa Luxemburg characterized it as \a sort of a
labor of Sisyphus" (1970, p. 43) in which social victories would be continually
eroded by market forces. More recently, conservative critics have made the re-
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consequences for economic performance (Lundberg, 1985). Neither view is proven
correct. Social equality and worker security have persisted in the Scandinavian
countries and economic growth has been at par with the US.
6.5.4. General Lessons
The Scandinavian experience is interesting for several reasons. First, it is an
interesting example of an endogenous change in the political equilibrium. Though
the background to this is no doubt the spread of democracy around the time of
the First World War, the proximate cause was the shock of the Great Depression.
It was certainly not a general phenomenon that this shock led to better political
equilibria in the world. In much of Latin America, for example, it led nascent
democratic governments to be overthrown and to the emergence of an inward
looking authoritarian development strategy that probably signi￿cantly retarded
economic growth during the second half of the 20th century. In Scandinavia,
however, the shock precipitated a very di￿erent reaction. This response changed
dramatically the way that the labor market worked and fed back into the entire
political equilibrium. While the gap between Scandinavia and the rest of the
World in 1930 was no doubt much smaller than that between Sierra Leone and
the US today, the evidence really suggests that these changes did alter the political
equilibrium in a way that generated the societies we see today. Scandinavia was
not always ‘di￿erent’ and if preferences between people in those countries di￿er
today, this is more likely to be an outcome of institutional di￿erences rather than
a cause.
Second, this examples suggests again the complex way in which good institu-
tions and good governance are created. The Scandinavian model generated rapid
economic growth and rising living standards. But it did it with very di￿erent
labor market institutions and welfare policies that at the same time promoted a
radically egalitarian distribution of income. Growth occurred for the standard
reasons, there were incentives to accumulate and save and the state provided
public goods, but many of these incentives were generated in the context of quite
55distinct speci￿c economic institutions (a theme of the literature on the ‘varieties
of capitalism’ see Hall and Soskice, 2001, and Rodrik, 2008).
6.6. Promoting Reform
So far we have discussed two examples, from the US South and Scandinavia, of
endogenous reforms. We conclude this section by returning to Sierra Leone and
asking what have we learned that might help us promote reform there or whether
reform is likely to come endogenously. We ￿rst observe that the See-Saw E￿ect
has been powerfully in operation in Sierra Leone (this is one of the sad lessons
of the previous experience of structural adjustment in the country which Herbst
(1990), Gri￿ths (2003), Reno (1995, 1998) and made so much of). The experience
of Sierra Leone has been precisely that attempted reform in one dimension has
led to disreform in another. How then might one push the political equilibrium in
Sierra Leone in the direction of better outcomes? One idea comes from our earlier
discussion about the construction of patrimonialism in the country. At some deep
level it is di￿cult to change the attractiveness of patrimonialism as a political
strategy. It is obviously an incredibly e￿ective way of binding your supporters
to you and disarticulating your opponents. Things of course may have changed.
First, Sierra Leone may be more of a nation state now and there may be more of
a sense of national identity than there was in the 1960s or 1970s, the lack of which
we have argued makes patrimonial rule attractive. Second, people’s preferences
(We hesitate to use the word ‘values’) may have changed in a way which makes
the ‘patrimonial exchange’ more di￿cult to consummate. In essence citizens may
be less happy with patronage now, they want development. The evidence on this
seems to be very mixed however. So the structural underpinnings of patrimonial
rule may have changed, but they probably have not have changed much. We don’t
think the World Bank of international institutions and governments can do much
about this in any case. What they can do is to focus more on how institutions
were changed to facilitate patrimonialism.
Leaving the social structure aside, it is clear from the facts about Stevens’ rule
and from the wider African evidence that certain sorts of political institutions
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pend democracy, he also made himself president and concentrated power in the
executive. He also accumulated power in Freetown. The international community
clearly recognized this when they pushed for decentralization after 2002 and the
re-introduction of district councils and more generally of course the support for
multi-party democracy in the country. Trying to decentralize power and resources
out of Freetown was surely an excellent idea. But this view which underpinned
this policy was not taken to its’ logical conclusion. In itself, just establishing
elected district councils has not done much to undermine executive dominance or
strengthen the system of checks and balances which are so crucial to a successful
democracy, it is only a small part of reforms in political institutions which might
be potentially useful.
The obvious conclusion from the discussion so far is that other reforms of
political institutions are needed which would further unwind the legacy of par-
timonialism. The most important aspect of this is the power of the executive,
particularly relative to parliament. This is an obvious conclusion from the experi-
ence of Sierra Leone and Africa more generally. We reiterate however that we are
still far from having a convincing framework which will help us understand how to
change the political economy equilibrium of a society and few changes, not even
reducing the power of the president or even reversing presidentialism, have such
a large impact as the potential ability to join the European Union.
7. Conclusions
Returning in conclusion to Killick’s mango canning factory discussed in the in-
troduction we can ask was this example of bad governance, and many others
like it, the reason for such poor economic performance in Ghana? Our argument
suggests that such projects were part of the channel via which the political equi-
librium created poor performance. Such projects were driven by the patrimonial
logic underlying Nkrumah’s political strategy and good governance in the sense
of choosing rational public sector investments was inconsistent with Nkrumah’s
goal of consolidating his political power (Robinson and Torvik, 2005). So bad
57governance in the sense of an ine￿ective state was economically costly but was
nevertheless politically attractive or perhaps expedient. This was because these
projects allowed Nkrumah to employ his supporters or generate rents for contrac-
tors in parts of the country where he needed to consolidate his support. Bad
governance in this sense was a consequence of bad governance in the other sense,
of the nexus of political institutions which determine the political equilibrium. By
the time the mango canning factory was built, Nkrumah had suspended democ-
racy and made himself president so there was little accountability and little chance
for the immizerized citizens of Ghana to contest this economically costly decision.
It is possible then to attribute important consequences for development to
governance. Nevertheless, we have argued in this chapter that the literature on
governance is really part of the more general literature on the political economy
of institutions and development and so far the proponents of governance have not
made a strong case that there is something called ‘governance’ which is conceptu-
ally distinct and which is causally related to development. As yet governance has
not been unbundled and indeed appears too vague to be unbundled. This being
the case, though we have attempted here to enter into the spirit of the literature
on governance, we are ultimately quite sceptical about what the term, as currently
wielded by its proponents, adds to our understanding of development.
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Somalia -2.21 Somalia -2.35 Somalia -2.36 Equatorial Guinea -1.79 Haiti 1.8
North Korea -1.82 North Korea -2.31 Iraq -1.81 Somalia -1.74 Guinea 1.9
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. -1.64 Zimbabwe -2.2
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. -1.76 Haiti -1.45 Myanmar 1.9
Iraq -1.64 Myanmar -2.19 Afghanistan -1.68 Myanmar -1.44 Iraq 1.9
Comoros -1.63 Turkmenistan -1.95 Haiti -1.62 Sudan -1.4 Chad 2
Myanmar -1.61 Eritrea -1.84 Liberia -1.6 Afghanistan -1.37 Bangladesh 2
Turkmenistan -1.57 Cuba -1.75 Myanmar -1.56 Congo, Dem. Rep. -1.34 Sudan 2
Central African 
Republic -1.47 Uzbekistan -1.71 Sudan -1.48 North Korea -1.32
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 2





Rep. -1.66 Zimbabwe -1.47 Tonga -1.28 Cote d`Ivoire 2.1
Equatorial 
Guinea -1.42 Afghanistan -1.63 Congo, Rep of -1.42 Iraq -1.27 Cambodia 2.1
Haiti -1.39 Comoros -1.63 Turkmenistan -1.41 Zimbabwe -1.24 Uzbekistan 2.1
Togo -1.38 Iraq -1.61 Nigeria -1.38 Cote d`Ivoire -1.23 Belarus 2.1
Cote d`Ivoire -1.38 Belarus -1.53 Guinea-Bissau -1.33 Nigeria -1.22 Kenya 2.2
Liberia -1.36 Iran -1.49
Equatorial 
Guinea -1.33 Chad -1.22 Kyrgyzstan 2.2
Burundi -1.34 Libya -1.44 Uzbekistan -1.31 Paraguay -1.19 Nigeria 2.2




Republic -1.29 Bangladesh -1.18
Sudan -1.3 Sudan -1.29 Angola -1.28 Cameroon -1.15
Syria -1.23 Angola -1.24 Chad -1.23 Cambodia -1.12
Afghanistan -1.2
Central African 
Republic -1.23 Venezuela -1.22 Laos -1.1
Table 1: The World’s Most Poorly Governed CountriesFigure 1: Supervisor Cowperthwaite’s excise round, 12 
June to 5 July 1710, Richmond, Yorkshire.
Source: Brewer, John (1988) The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783,
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Figure 14: Clientelism and Innovative Laws in ItalyFigure 15: Central Bank Independence and Inflation in 
ZimbabweFigure 16: The See-Saw Effect in Colombia and Argentina